Rhineland-Vosges Campaign Overview

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Introduction

Before drilling into the details of the 442nd’s battles in the Vosges Mountains, it is important to understand the bigger picture of the tactical situation.  The following describes the U.S. Army units who were fighting to break through the densely wooded mountains into the Alsace plains to the east and across the Rhine River into central and southern Germany.  The Nazi forces defending this mountain barrier, and their advantages of terrain, weather, manpower, and weapons are described. 

This “bigger picture” is followed by a day-by-day narrative of the 442nd’s battles in this campaign, as written in 1945 while the 442nd was on occupation duty following the end of the war.

U.S. 7th Army Tactical Situation

Background

The following is a direct extract from:  Keith E. Bonn. When the Odds Were Even; The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944-January 1945. Presidio Press: New York, 2006, pages 86-97.

Prelude to Battle

Although the Americans had a roughly 1.35 to 1 numerical advantage in the Vosges, the Germans held the advantages of defending known territory, terrain and prepared positions (Clausewitz’s “intrinsically stronger form” of warfare), and of living in shelters in increasingly bad weather, which would significantly diminish their cold weather casualties and contribute to higher morale. In addition, the role of air power was obviated by the weather, and the lopsided American advantage in armor (three battalions of medium tanks and two of tank destroyers for the VI Corps to two for the Germans in this sector) was considerably offset by the mountainous terrain and winding, easily mined roads. The victor, therefore, would be decided not by numbers, air power, or armor superiority, but by training and tactical proficiency.

The VI Corps’ commanders and staffs knew from bitter experience in Italy that mountain warfare against entrenched German units was costly and slow. On the other hand, the Germans knew that the Vosges terrain was ideal for making a stand throughout the winter months as an economy of force measure; that is, to make up with terrain advantages those shortages identified in equipment and personnel. To avoid a reprise of his Italian winter experiences, [Lieutenant General Lucian K.] Truscott pressed forward as rapidly as possible against the German first-line defenses.

However, just as logistical limitations were forcing the neighboring Third Army to stall, so too were the long lines leading to the Vosges from Marseille and Toulon stretched to their breaking points. With nearly twice the number of combat formations to support (since the addition of XV Corps), and with ever-growing distances to cover, Seventh Army’s supply situation at the time of [Lieutenant General Alexander M.] Patch’s 29 December directive simply would not allow an immediate major thrust.

By the first week of October, in fact, the American supply situation had been deemed “critical”.[54]  Control Supply Rates (CSRs) for ammunition were imposed on all Seventh Army units, especially artillery and mortar units. Fifteen to twenty rounds per gun or tube per day were common CSRs; clearly, no major offensive could be undertaken with such constraints.[55]  To conserve ammunition, even harassing fires (H & I, harassing and interdictory fires), important to any operation, were eliminated during the day and curtailed to a maximum of five rounds per gun at night.[56]

By the end of the second week in October, however, these problems had largely been alleviated. A combination of the reorganization of supply channels supporting Seventh Army and the establishment of supply distribution facilities closer to the front at Charmes, Mirecourt, and  Épinal caused the logistic situation to improve to the point where Truscott was willing to launch his attack.[57]  Unfortunately, the two-week intermission had given the German Nineteenth Army additional time to prepare their defenses in depth along the Vosges massif.

The outer defenses against which the VI Corps attack would be launched consisted of strong points of the first line of Vosges defenses, occupied by battalion- and regimental-strength units. The key terrain in the U. S. VI Corps zone was initially the town of Bruyères, because it controlled the road net needed to support operations toward St. Dié and the Vosges passes of Ste. Marie-aux-Mines and Le Bonhomme beyond the Meurthe River.

The Drive On Bruyères:

     [Note: references to 442nd RCT bolded for emphasis]

Responsibility for the defense of Bruyères fell on the 16th Volks-Grenadier Division, but the southern approaches to the town were along the boundary between LXXXIX Corps and LXIV Corps, so the 716th Volks-Grenadier Division would be engaged by the 36th Infantry Division’s assault as well. (See Figure 10.) The subordinate units of the 16th Volks-Grenadier Division around Bruyères included the 2d Battalion and elements of the 1st Battalion of the Grenadier Regiment 223, as well as the Fortress Machinegun Battalion 49. These units were at about 60 percent strength in personnel but possessed nearly all the heavy weapons (machine guns, mortars, and artillery) of full-strength German units of their types.[58]

Two battalions of the 716th Volks-Grenadier Division’s Grenadier Regiment 736 were employed around Champ-le-Duc and Laval-sur-Vologne, along with various other nondivisional units, such as the Reserve Light Infantry (Jäger) Battalion 38. (See Figure 11.)

Thus, the VI Corps’ assault elements conducting the main attack, the 36 Infantry Division’s 143d Infantry Regiment (minus the 2d Battalion, held in division reserve), and the attached 442d Regimental Combat Team (Nisei) would be facing an enemy with only about fifty percent of their American adversaries’ personnel strength but with nearly the same amount of long-range firepower, especially at the battalion level.

Bruyères is a typical village in that it lies in a small valley dominated by several major hills. Its characteristically Alsatian stone and masonry structures make ideal defensive positions. Any house can be turned into a pill box, practically impervious to small-arms fire, within a few hours, let alone the two weeks the Americans’ logistical problems had afforded the defenders.[59]  To isolate these positions around Bruyères and to prevent German reinforcements from the south, Major General [John E.] Dahlquist of the 36th Infantry Division deployed the 141st and 442d Infantry Regiments along broad frontages to the south. In a terse two-and-a-half-page division order, Dahlquist directed the regiments to conduct supporting attacks toward the Vologne River.  Since his division was augmented by the 442d Infantry Regiment (Nisei) for this particular operation, he massed it and the 143d Infantry Regiment for the main attack within an extremely narrow sector against the 16th and 716th Volks-Grenadier Divisions’ defenses around Bruyères.[60]  Under the VI Corps plan, the 45th Infantry Division would simultaneously conduct a supporting attack towards Brouvelieures along the Bruyères-St. Diè road to cut off either German retreat or reinforcement from this direction. Major General Eagles selected the 179th Infantry Regiment for this important maneuver.

This corps penetration would be carried out by ordering the regiments conducting the attack (143d and 442d) to execute an envelopment. Rather than assaulting Bruyères only from the obvious avenues of approach—up the Laval-Bruyères road— Dahlquist chose to make only a supporting attack from this direction. The 442d Infantry Regiment would make the main attack by advancing stealthily through the thickly wooded woods to the west of Bruyères and enveloping the defender’s flank. The regimental commander subsequently chose to attack with the 100th and 2d Battalions leading and the 3d Battalion in reserve.[61]

To give the impression that the main attack was to come from the south, the 57mm antitank guns of all three divisional infantry regiments’ antitank companies were massed along the Laval-Bruyères road. These short-range guns fired in support of the 143d Infantry Regiment as it advanced, with the 1st Battalion attacking northeastward up the road and the 3d Battalion attacking first to secure Champ-le-Duc to the east, then turning north to support the 1st Battalion’s assault. The 2d Battalion remained in division reserve.[62]

Initially, then, four American infantry battalions assaulted three reinforced battalions of dug-in German infantry. Over mountainous or hilly terrain, machineguns would dominate, and the matchup in machine guns was close. Indeed, the machine gun strength of the four assaulting American battalions was about fifty-six 30-caliber weapons, both water-cooled M1917A1s and air-cooled M1919A4s. The German units defending the Bruyères area employed at least forty-two MG34s and MG42s, which, with their 40 percent higher rates of fire, could put out at least as much lead as their American adversaries’ machine guns. The Americans could call on some sixty 60mm and 81mm mortars, whereas the Germans could depend on about two-thirds of that number of their own 80mm mortars.[63]  The Americans massed antitank guns would face little more than half their own number, however.

Of course, the Germans could also depend on familiarity with the terrain over which they had had several days, if not weeks, to prepare their defenses. Hundreds of antipersonnel and antitank mines had been skillfully laid along the southerly approaches to Bruyères. Houses and other buildings had been selected to serve both as pillboxes and observation posts, and fields of fire had been carefully selected and cleared.[64]  The approaches to Bruyères from the south and southwest were largely open and rolling, providing the defenders with plenty of opportunity for early acquisition and effective long-range engagement of the advancing Texas Division attackers. German doctrine called for designation of landmarks as registration points for indirect fires, and these, too, no doubt had already been chosen and confirmed. The Americans, on the other hand, had to adjust fires as the attack progressed.

The avenue of approach chosen for the main attack was of a very different character. The thickly wooded ridges to the west of Bruyères provided dense primary and secondary growth, thus concealing both attacker and defender until they were really close to each other. The one exception to this was the approaches to Hill 571 (its altitude in meters), which dominated the town from the northwest. This hill has a commanding view of all westward approaches from across a 100-meter-deep, open ravine, the traverse of which would be all but impossible in the face of concentrated small-arms fire by the defenders.[65]  The attack on Bruyères began on the morning of 15 October 1944 in a cold drizzle with a considerable ground fog.[66]  This weather was both a blessing and a curse for the attackers, because it obscured the initial American advance from German observation but at the same time gave the attackers a miserable time the night before. The Germans no doubt spent a more comfortable night, entrenched as they were in and around Bruyères’ stout buildings. In order to launch their attack at 0800 hours, the infantrymen of the 143d and 442d Regiments had to be up and awake in the 40-degree-Fahrenheit downpour since 0645 hours, well before dawn that day. Morale was adversely affected; at times like that, the cohesion born of long association and training together becomes critical.

The defenders, especially those in the polyglot 16th Volks-Grenadier Division in Bruyères itself did not share this common cohesive background. Their commander, Generalleutnant [Ernst] Häckel, wrote after the battle that because they hardly knew one another, his commanders and men “often crack soon after their commitment.”[67]  In this critical battle, the American superiority in this regard would combine with aggressive and intelligent maneuver to produce an important victory.

The Germans of the 716th Volks-Grenadier Division fiercely contested the 143d Infantry Regiment’s assault on Laval-sur-Vologne and Champ-le-Duc, and the 16th Volks-Grenadier Division’s Grenadier Regiment 223 did the same to the 442d Infantry Regiment’s advance through the Forêt Communale de Bruyères. The defenders’ strength in machine guns and mortars became apparent during this fight as the stone and masonry structures on each road were skillfully defended. Each time ground was lost to the advancing Americans, an artillery- or mortar-supported counterattack was mounted as quickly as possible to recover the yielded territory. Chester Tanaka, a member of the 442d RCT, pointed out the attacking Americans “did not know that this was the beginning of a far different kind of fight than the one waged in Italy. Here, the battleground was close to the German border. In Italy the Germans could afford to trade real estate for time, men and material. In the Bruyères sector…their fortifications were deeper and more extensive, their firepower heavier and more intense, and their troops grimmer and more determined.”[68]

After four days of vicious fighting, however, the Germans found themselves outmaneuvered. The advance of the Nisei of the “Go for Broke” Regiment across heavily wooded and deeply scored terrain had sealed off the 16th Volks-Grenadier Division, and the 179th Infantry’s advance to the Bruyères-Brouvelieures road prevented reinforcements from that direction. Although a series of German counterattacks temporarily cut off the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, in the woods to the east of Bruyères (the much-publicized “Lost Battalion” of contemporary newspaper and postwar movie fame), a forceful drive by the 442d RCT brought relief before the supply situation of the stranded battalion became critical.

As the 36th Infantry Division assaulted Bruyères and the 179th Infantry Regiment attacked Brouvelieures, the remainder of the 45th Infantry Division supported the VI Corps’ efforts with limited objective attacks in the area east of Rambervillers.[69]  (See the northerly prong of the 45th Infantry Division attack in Figure 10.) In this sector, the opposing 21st Panzer Division skillfully delayed the Thunderbirds’ advance with roadblocks, mines, and other obstacles, but the men of the 180th RCT nevertheless made consistent headway. On the northern flank of the division and corps, however, the 157th Infantry Regiment spent most of October in a stationary slugfest with the 21st Panzer Division’s Panzer-Grenadiers around the twin road junction town of Brû and Jeanménil. It was not until 29 October that the Germans withdrew from these rubbled villages to avoid being taken in flank by the advancing 180th Infantry Regiment in the south.[70]

To the south of Bruyères, the 3d Infantry Division feinted toward the Schlucht Pass with significant artillery activity. At the same time, the “Rock of the Marne” Division was ordered to quietly withdraw its 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments out of the line near Le Tholy and to attack through the 45th and 36th Division toward St. Dié. In this way, Truscott hoped to exploit the direct penetration at Bruyères  by massing five of his ten infantry regiments (the 442d, 143d, 7th, 15th, and 179th) in a ten-kilometer-wide corridor towards the Meurthe at St. Dié.

To make the Germans think that Schlucht Pass, and not St. Dié, was the VI Corps’ objective, a complex deception plan was undertaken by the Americans. With radio silence imposed, the 3d Infantry Division unobtrusively withdrew its 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments from the Corps’ right flank near Gerardmer to assembly areas near the 36th Infantry Division’s positions around Bruyères. Meanwhile, radio traffic from the 30th Infantry Regiment and other elements left behind near Le Tholy, on the right flank of the VI Corps zone, simulating the continuing presence of the 3d Division units. At the same time, 36th Division (141st and142d Infantry Regiments) troops “lost” helmets and other gear with 3d Infantry Division identification markings while on patrol. The advance elements of the 3d Infantry Division even wore 45th Infantry Division patches on their uniforms so as not to give away their presence to the defending Germans. As a result, the 19th Army failed to shift the 198th Infantry Division, or, initially, any other unit to the north to defend St. Dié, keeping them instead in place to defend along the 3d Infantry Division’s original axis of advance toward Schlucht Pass.[71]  The 3d Division then attacked up the road to St. Dié from Bruyères on 20 and 21 October against disorganized German resistance.[72]

Recognizing too late this dangerous situation represented by the penetration at Bruyères and the true nature of the 30th Infantry Regiment feint toward Schlucht Pass, Generalleutnant [Werner] von und zu Gilsa, Commander of LXXXIX Corps, on 28 October released newly arrived reinforcements to Generalmajor Häckel. Adding to the already chaotic organization of this division was the assignment of two well-equipped but inexperienced Austrian alpine infantry battalions, Gebirgsjäger (Mountain Infantry) Battalions 201 and 202, and Special Employment Battalions (“zur besondere Verwendung,” or penal infantry battalions) 291 and 292 totaling about 3,000 combat troops.[73]  Additionally, [General Heinrich F.] Wiese withdrew the Panzer Brigade 106 “Feldherrnhalle” from the French Army sector to the south, and committed it, organized into three combined arms battle groups, to counterattacks in the vicinity of La Salle in an attempt to halt the breakthrough.[74]

Although not even possessing numerical parity with the defenders (3,061 infantryman in the line and heavy-weapons companies with the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments 75 ) and fatigued by nearly two and a half months of continuous combat, the American infantrymen tore through these fresh German units as they slugged through the thickly wooded hills on either side of the winding Bruyères-St. Dié road.[76]  After eighteen days of brutal mountain combat, in subfreezing temperatures, nearly always attacking uphill into the faces of superior numbers of trained alpine troops, Panzer-Grenadiers, and desperate military criminals ensconced in two-thousand-plus-foot heights,[77]  the “Cottonbalers” seized Le Haut Jacques Pass and Tête de Blainbois  (Hill 616 altitude in meters) near the tiny village of Rougiville. Meanwhile, the “Can Dos” of the 15th Infantry fought past German defenses in similar terrain on either side of the road from the hamlet of Bout de Dessous to Nompatelize to seize La Bourgonce, La Salle, and Nompatelize, also by 3 November. Within two days, the leading elements of Maj. Gen. “Iron Mike” O’Daniel’s 3d Infantry Division  were overlooking the Meurthe Valley opposite St. Dié. As a testament to the ferocity of the fighting and the difficulty of the terrain between Bruyères and the Meurthe, numerous 3d Infantry Division veterans of the Italian campaign called this battle “worse than Anzio.”[78]